Companies are increasingly asked to provide innovative solutions to deep-seated problems of human misery, even as economic theory instructs managers to focus on maximizing their shareholders' wealth. In this paper, we assess how organization theory and empirical research have thus far responded to this tension over corporate involvement in wider social life. Organizational scholarship has typically sought to reconcile corporate social initiatives with seemingly inhospitable economic logic. Depicting the hold that economics has had on how the relationship between the firm and society is conceived, we examine the consequences for organizational research and theory by appraising both the 30-year quest for an empirical relationship between a corporation's social initiatives and its financial performance, as well as the development of stakeholder theory. We propose an alternative approach, embracing the tension between economic and broader social objectives as a starting point for systematic organizational inquiry. Adopting a pragmatic stance, we introduce a series of research questions whose answers will reveal the descriptive and normative dimensions of organizational responses to misery. 
The world cries out for repair. While some people in the world are well off, many more live in misery. Ironically, the magnitude of the problem defies easy recognition. With the global population exceeding six billion people, it is difficult to paint a vivid and compelling picture of social life. In the extreme, Bales (1999) conservatively estimated that there are 27 million slaves in the world today, while Attaran and Sachs (2001) reported that 35 million people are now infected with the HIV virus, 95 percent of them living in sub-Saharan Africa. Even more broadly, aggregate statistics both inform and numb. Compiled from data released by the World Bank (2002) , table 1 represents the kind of snapshot that such statistics provide. It can be shocking to learn that so many people live on less than $2.00 per day, that a quarter of the children in Bangladesh and Nigeria are at work in their nations' labor force, or that some countries have mortality rates for children under age five more than ten times that of the United States. Access to sanitation, let alone access to a telephone or computer, can be very limited around the world. The picture in the United States alone is as vivid and compelling. For twenty years, Americans have lived through a period of unparalleled prosperity. lbbotson Associates (2000) calculated that in real terms, a dollar invested in large company stocks in December 1925 was worth $24.79 by year-end 1979 . Exactly twenty years later, that dollar was worth $303.09. Nevertheless, the fact that the upper echelon of society disproportionately reaped these gains is no longer news. Even as debate persists about intercountry income inequality (Firebaugh, 1999) , Galbraith (1998) , and Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1999) provided a comprehensive picture of wealth inequality in the United States, while Conley (1999) clearly pointed out that many black Americans have been left out of this economic boom. Table 1 provides a comparative portrait of how the top 10 percent of the people in each of the world's thirteen largest countries control so much (1997) Fortune reputation rating Accounting Riahi-Belkaoui (1991) Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market Roberts (1992) CEP evaluation captures the basic approaches for measuring social and financial performance and reports which authors found which results, including positive, non-significant, negative, and mixed relationships.
A clear signal emerges from these 127 studies. A simple compilation of the findings suggests there is a positive association, and certainly very little evidence of a negative association, between a company's social performance and its financial performance. A recent meta-analysis of 52 CSP-CFP studies reached this same substantive conclusion (Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003) . Concerns about misappropriation, and perhaps even misallocation, would seem to be alleviated. If corporate social performance contributes to corporate financial performance, then a firm's resources are being used to advance the interests of shareholders, the rightful claimants in the economic contractarian model. Concerns about misallocation recede as well. If social performance is contributing to financial performance, then the firm is being used to advance the objective for which it is considered to be best suited, maximizing wealth. Although it can be argued that a company's resources might be used to produce even more wealth, were they devoted to some activity other than CSP, studies of the link between CSP and CFP reveal little evidence that CSP destroys value, injures shareholders in a significant way, or damages the wealth-creating capacity of firms. The empirical relationship between CSP and CFP would seem to be established and the underlying economic concerns about CSP alleviated. Even as research into the relationship between CSP and CFP addresses the objections posed by economic contractarianism, however, a closer look at this research suggests that it opens as many questions as it answers about the role of the firm in society.
What appears to be a definite link between CSP and CFP may turn out to be more illusory than the body of results suggests. The steady flow of research studies reflects ongoing efforts both to resolve the tension between advocates and critics of corporate social performance and to shore up the methodological and theoretical weaknesses in past studies. There have been 13 reviews of this CSP-CFP research published since 1978, nine in the past ten years alone ( (Freeman, 1984: 46) . Looking at the business corporation through something other than the eyes of its equity holders has inspired great efforts to translate that intuitive appeal into a theory. Donaldson and Preston (1995) counted more than a dozen books and 100 articles devoted to stakeholder theory; Wolfe and Putler (2002) counted 76 articles on the stakeholder theme published in just six journals in the 1990s. The promise of stakeholder theory to offer a cogent alternative to the economic account of the firm, however, is impeded by a set of assumptions designed to accommodate economic considerations.
Taking stock of stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Preston (1995) introduced an influential taxonomy that sorts it into three types: descriptive, normative, and instrumental. Descriptive stakeholder theory focuses on whether and to what extent managers do in fact attend to various stakeholders and act in accord with their interests. Normative stakeholder theory explores whether managers ought to attend to stakeholders other than shareholders and, if so, on what grounds these various stakeholders have justifiable claims on the firm. Instrumental stakeholder theory delineates and investigates the consequences-most notably, the economic benefits-that follow from attending to a range of stakeholders. Instrumental versions of stakeholder theory can either be descriptive, positing and investigating the beneficial consequences that accrue to the firm, such as efficient contracting (Jones, 1995), or normative, justifying the claims of stakeholders on the basis of the benefits that accrue to the firm from attending to those claims (Freeman, 1999; Freeman and Phillips, 2002; Jensen, 2002) . Whereas Donaldson and Preston encouraged greater attention to normative questions about stakeholders, the scholarship devoted to stakeholder theory has focused largely on instrumental considerations. Jones and Wicks (1999) formally proposed a convergent stakeholder theory to blend instrumental considerations with the ongoing efforts to create a normative theory. Although Freeman (1999: 235) eschewed Donaldson and Preston's tripartite division of stakeholder theory as well as the subsequent integration, he also concluded that to buttress any normative injunction for managers to attend to key stakeholders, "it is hard to see how such an argument can be connected to real firms and real stakeholders without some kind of instrumental claim." Revealing the grip that instrumental reasoning has on stakeholder theory, Post, Preston, and Sachs (2002: 19) recently defined stakeholders explicitly by the contribution stakeholders make to wealth creation or destruction: "The stakeholders in a corporation are the individuals and constituencies that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity and activities, and are therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers."
It is taken to be a practical necessity that stakeholder theory revolve around consequences, financial consequences Dunfee, 1999) . How do these grounds for action inform our perspective on the place of the firm in society? How can their implications for action, in the face of calls for corporate responses to ameliorate social misery, be sorted out alongside the compelling instrumental purpose of the firm to enhance material welfare and maximize wealth?
A preoccupation with instrumental consequences renders a theory that accommodates economic premises yet sidesteps the underlying tensions between the social and economic imperatives that confront organizations. Such a theory risks omitting the pressing descriptive and normative questions raised by these tensions, which, when explored, might hold great promise for new theory, and even for addressing practical management challenges. How do firms navigate their way through these tensions? How ought they to do so? Organizational inquiry must go beyond efforts to reconcile corporate responses to social misery with the neoclassical model of the firm. Rather, this social and economic tension should serve as a starting point for new theory and research.
Exploring the Antinomy
Organizational scholars and managers alike find themselves in the clutches of an antinomy (Alexander, 1988 "Does the successful business try first to profit or to serve?" From society's perspective, creating wealth and contributing to material well-being are essential corporate goals. But restoring and equipping human beings, as well as protecting and repairing the natural environment, are also essential objectives. Companies may be well designed to advance the first set of objectives, yet they operate in a world plagued by a host of recalcitrant problems that hamper the second set. These vying objectives place claims on the firm that are often difficult to rank and reconcile. Where economic contractarians see instrumental inefficiency and illicit conduct in directing corporate resources toward redressing social misery, those who advocate broader corporate social initiatives see instrumental efficiency and duties fulfilled.
The antinomy reveals itself more explicitly in the face of appeals for companies to take a more active and expanded role in society. Some line up to warn of the danger in heeding these appeals, while others point to empirical findings to relieve concern. Both avenues of intellectual response, already reviewed in this paper, attempt to remove the antinomy in one of two classic ways (Nussbaum, 1986: By adopting economic assumptions, organization theory and research handicaps itself in yet another way. It leaves organizations that seek to respond to these calls for social involvement bereft of prescriptive guidance for how to do so. Simply knowing that the economic tide is with them does not provide managers with insight about how to respond properly and effectively. Organizations face a troublesome reality, in which specific requests to help fight AIDS, support homeless shelters, or improve local schools may or may not generate economic gains for the firm. The field of organization studies has largely been silent about how to consider and manage the tradeoffs and dilemmas that arise when companies confront dueling expectations.
A Reorienting Perspective
The grip of economic assumptions must be released in favor of an alternative premise, one that expands the focus of organizational scholarship. We suggest adopting a pragmatic stance toward questions about the firm's role in society, one articulated most clearly by William James (1975: 97): "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it [pragmatism] says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those that would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?" The first step of James's pragmatic approach is to assume that an idea is true. In this case, we need to begin with the idea that organizations can play an effective role in ameliorating social misery. From that beginning, pragmatism then instructs us to look at the consequences of acting on this belief. Do companies really make a concrete difference in curing social ills when they act as though they can do so? The lens of research shifts away from confirming the consistency between corporate actions and economic premises about the firm. Research would instead focus on unearthing the effects that corporate actions to redress social ills actually have. The pragmatic perspective poses a second question: How can the assumed truth that companies can be effective agents, not just of economic efficiency but of social repair, be realized? How can the concrete differences be achieved? This lays out a new direction for theory. What are the conditions under which, and the processes through which, the intended beneficiaries and institutions central to a healthy society indeed benefit from these corporate actions? Systematic descriptive research is just as necessary to examine the consequences of corporate actions as it is to identify their antecedents and the processes that bring them about.
Although we are proposing an alternative starting point for inquiry into the role of the firm in society, we are not making a steadfast normative claim about the appropriate role for the firm in society. The pragmatic stance does not require that other beliefs be relinquished. Those who believe that society is best served if companies focus solely on maximizing wealth can adhere to their convictions, as can those who believe that other stakeholders beyond the shareholder deserve attention, whatever the repercussions for profitability. The aim here is to test a pragmatic belief to determine if acting on the basis of that belief produces the desired consequences. How those consequences are to be weighed and pursued relative to others is a matter for normative theory. Here too, organizational scholarship must extend its efforts.
The challenge for those who study organizations is to investigate what happens when it is assumed that instrumental effi-
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ciency and human beneficence, wealth maximization and the amelioration of social misery, and shareholder rights and stakeholder rights all matter. A normative theory of the firm will acknowledge these competing conceptions and accommodate the tension. Instead of trying to assert the legitimacy of one set of claims and deny the legitimacy of the other, or to imagine that all of these competing interests can somehow be synthetically reconciled, theorists must undertake the task of working out the principles and guidelines for managing tradeoffs. A starting point for building such a theory requires a systematic descriptive inquiry into corporations' responses to calls for an expanded role. These insights can then combine inductively with a rigorous philosophical analysis to construct a normative conception of the firm and its purpose. A descriptive research agenda lays the foundation for the inductive development of a normative theory of the firm. As we investigate how corporations do or do not respond to misery, we can think about how they ought to respond to misery.
TOWARD A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE FIRM
The antinomy poses a fundamental question for organization theorists and managers: How can business organizations respond to human misery while also sustaining their legitimacy, securing vital resources, and enhancing financial performance? This question may best be addressed through a partnership between systematic descriptive research and inductive normative theory. We need to paint a clear and comprehensive portrait of how firms navigate these competing objectives in their responses to social ills. To do this, economic assumptions about business organizations must be dislodged, though not discarded or discounted, in favor of a pragmatic assumption that permits examination, before cross-examination, of corporate responses to misery. Here we echo a recent call in psychology to investigate complex social phenomena as they occur in the real world before moving to tests of theoretical propositions (Rozin, 2001) . A portrait of corporate responses to social misery then informs normative inquiry into the antinomy itself.
Rather than stating the firm's preeminent role and purpose, defending it, and deductively deriving principles of action that follow, our inductive approach begins with the complex interplay of vying objectives, duties, and concerns. Inductive normative theorizing asks the question, How might the role, purpose, and function of the firm be specified so as to acknowledge a range of inconsistent concerns and still facilitate action? While acknowledging the conflict between social misery and economic efficiency, an inductive normative theory seeks not to resolve the conflict but to clarify the competing considerations, probe what gives them weight, and explore their relationship. The goal is to craft a purpose and role for the firm that builds internal coherence among competing and incommensurable objectives, duties, and concerns (Richardson, 1997) . While the aim of our descriptive agenda is to survey the state of corporate responses to social misery, and thereby ascertain how companies do indeed navigate through the antinomy, the aim of our norma-
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A Descriptive Research Agenda
Firms make social investments in the face of compelling economic reasoning not to do so. The discrepancy between actual practice and the theoretically espoused purpose of the firm prompts a quest for explanation. It is a classic sensemaking situation. To make sense of corporate conduct, it is especially appropriate to follow Weick's (1995: 183) counsel to "talk the walk": "To 'talk the walk' is to be opportunistic in the best sense of the word. It is to search for words that make sense of current walking that is adaptive for reasons that are not yet clear." To make sense of corporate responses to misery and discern the function of those responses, we need to understand which firms respond to which social problems, with what consequences, for both the firms and society. It is best to explore this kind of broad research terrain with a map in hand (Weick, 1995: Why do companies end up considering the set of options they do? At least three possible approaches can be identified. First, a firm may deliberately appraise its assets and capabilities and then generate options that tap into these resources (Dunfee and Hess, 2000) . UPS, for example, drew on its logistics capabilities when it created a technical service manual for food rescue programs (www.community.ups). Second, a firm may look to potential partners in civil society and develop a relationship that might even grow over time (Sagawa and Segal, 2000) . The relationship between Timberland and City Year represents how these collaborations can deepen through the years (Austin, 2000) . Finally, the process may be more externally driven and nearly automatic. Companies may identify widely practiced options that adhere to standards of accepted conduct. Galaskiewicz (1991) , 1958) , or do they make sense of their social initiatives retrospectively (Weick, 1979 (Weick, , 1995 , assigning a meaningful (but retroactive) explanation for why the selected course was taken?
In unearthing the criteria companies use to assess responses to human misery, descriptive research can reveal how companies wrestle with the competing expectations that contested conceptions of the firm's role and purpose impose. If consequences are used to evaluate response options, the set of consequences may reflect the ways in which conflicting conceptions of the firm's role are being negotiated. For example, what sort of return is assessed when companies evaluate options by calculating a return on investment? Perhaps companies try to calculate the financial benefits to the firm, mimicking the research conducted for over 30 years, or perhaps they employ a more expansive definition of return and focus their attention on worker morale and commitment, corporate reputation in capital and product markets, or the legitimacy gained with regulatory authorities. Alternatively, companies may evaluate the benefits for society, estimating, for example, the greatest humanitarian gain per dollar spent. If so, how is the humanitarian gain assessed? Conflicting conceptions of the firm's role and purpose may also be reflected in how the appropriateness of corporate social initiatives is evaluated. In the face of the shareholder wealth maximization ideology, using criteria of appropriateness permits consistency between this ideology and corporate social initiatives. Companies may create the responses themselves, the "make" option, when they have a distinctive capability that fits a specific, evident social need (Dunfee and Hess, 2000) . Charitable contributions, the "buy" option, may be the selected design option either when a firm lacks any specific capability to address a social need, yet the need is pressing, or when existing institutions have excellent capabilities in the area in which the firm seeks to invest. A "hybrid" strategy, or public-private partnership, may be the option of choice when the firm has something to give and gain from others when it makes its social investments (Austin, 2000) . A highly recognizable partner, such as Amnesty International, may reduce uncertainty for managers and increase the likelihood of reputational benefits for the firm. Examples of such partnerships abound (Sagawa and Segal, 2000) and seem to be increasing (Zadek, 2001: 91) . Categorizing corporate responses using this scheme of make, buy, or hybrid can provide insight into the factors that shape companies' investment and control decisions surrounding responses to social ills.
Beyond their design, little is known about how companies internally control, monitor, and discipline their social initiatives. First, how much do companies choose to invest, in total and as a percentage of available investment capital, in ameliorating societal ills? Economic logic suggests a level that meets a bare minimum for deriving benefits for the firm (Friedman, 1970) , whereas behavioral research suggests that standards of fairness (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986), irrational by economic standards, may shape allocation decisions. Second, corporate responses to social misery have aims distinct from other corporate activities, so corporate control of these initiatives warrants scrutiny as well. Understanding the forms of control used to steer social initiatives toward their aims and exploring how those forms of control commingle with traditional forms of financial control is central to a descriptive research agenda. The calls for the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate disclosure of philanthropic contributions (Kahn, 1997; Bagley and Page, 1999; Gillmor and Bremer, 1999) suggest that monitoring and control mechanisms are underdeveloped. With a variety of instrumental, moral, political, and institutional considerations motivating social initiatives, we need to know how corporate social initiatives are monitored and disciplined.
Consequences. Although the financial effects of corporate social performance have been extensively studied, little is known about any other consequences of corporate social initiatives. Most notably, as calls for corporate involvement increase, there is a vital need to understand how corporate efforts to redress social misery actually affect their intended beneficiaries. Again, a first step is simply to ascertain the consequences and discern salient patterns. What are the conditions under which positive consequences result for beneficiaries? As firms become involved in fixing societal problems, we also need to know what happens to public political processes. Kahn (1997: 635), for example, was concerned about "the dangers implied by the concentration of not only the factors of production, but also communal resources in the hands of corporate management." The street protests against the work of the World Trade Organization (Economist, 1999) and both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Economist, 2000) suggest that members of society are asking these same kinds of questions. Some may consider Friedman's (1970) concerns alarmist, but asking companies to advance educational reform, assist with reproductive health, and fund cancer research does give firms and their executives significant influence over public policy, typically considered to be the domain of elected officials. How do these investments affect the political sphere, most notably democratic processes and accountability? Even if these investments meet their intended humanitarian goals, they might carry unintended consequences for government functioning (Reich, 1998) .
Looking beyond the content of corporate programs, the processes through which corporate activities are generated, selected, and implemented may have differential effects worth uncovering. Understanding the consequences of corporate involvement-the impact on targeted problems and on the functioning of other civil and political institutions, as well as on the firm itself-lies at the heart of questions about the relationship between organizations and societies. Research into those consequences can help highlight the tradeoffs of seeking corporate involvement, inform decisions about when to involve and when to limit such corporate involvement, and guide policies for managing the consequences when companies do get involved. Examining and evaluating these consequences, however, invites another line of inquiry, normative in nature. causal associations, normative guidance prescribes advisable behavior if an actor wishes to achieve certain outcomes.
In its philosophical sense, and the way we use it here, normative refers to the underlying justification that gives moral weight (Korsgaard, 1996b) : the source of value that makes certain options, decisions, and courses of action those worthy of selection. The instrumental benefit of some courses of action is one source of philosophically normative justification, but it begs the deeper question of why those outcomes themselves are to be sought. Normative inquiry of the philosophical sort investigates how we ought to act in light of why, weighing various considerations, that is the right, just, or good course of action (Scanlon, 1992) .
Normative theory is directed toward actors on the cusp of taking action. It is about clarifying and constructing the reasons and grounds that ought to inform the actor's choice of action, rather than discovering the causal explanations of what will occur as a result of the action (Putnam, 1994; Korsgaard, 1996a Korsgaard, , 1996b Tensions are not irritants to be removed by dismissing certain considerations or justifying the preeminence of others. Instead, the inductive approach uses tensions and inconsistencies between considerations to prompt elaboration and clarification of each objective, duty, and concern. The inductive route travels from identifying a core set of considerations (Rawls, 1971; Scanlon, 1992) to juxtaposing them so as to elaborate their moral weight and refine them (Nussbaum, 1986; Richardson, 1997) , especially in light of the specific situation being examined. A framework for action is then formulated by exploring how these considerations interact with features of the situation, specifying what is obligatory, permissible, and prohibited.
To take up our specific antinomy, a first step is to identify and probe the set of objectives, duties, and concerns that arise when business organizations confront the question of whether to help redress human misery. We need to identify the central considerations underlying the initial concerns and judgments provoked by the question (Rawls, 1971; Scanlon, 1992) . For example, at least three economic arguments against corporate efforts need to be explored. The first represents the claims of property (Hsieh, 2003) , claims that give rise to concerns about misappropriation. The rightful claimants to certain resources ought not to have those resources used for purposes they neither license nor receive compensation for. Second, there are concerns surrounding efficiency (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999) . Resources should be devoted to purposes for which they are designed and not misallocated to purposes for which they are not well suited. Third, there are concerns of due process, which require that even justifiable actions be taken in accord with procedures that respect rights and afford subsequent accountability.
Juxtaposed to these three concerns are three forms of the duty to aid and respond. First, there is the duty to respond that attaches to a company when it contributes to the conditions that necessitate a response, conditions that create some form of cost, violation, or degradation that others bear. This is the intuitively sensible but intellectually complex terrain in which causal responsibility gives rise to moral responsibility (Hart and Honor6, 1985; Schoeman, 1987) . Second, there is the duty to respond to deleterious or unjust conditions from which a company benefits, but to which it has not contributed (Hsieh, 2003) . This is an acute extension of the domain of fair play (Rawls, 1971; Applbaum, 1996; Phillips, 1997) , in which the derivation of benefits (even from unwitting parties) calls for some compensatory exchange. Even when a company compensates those from whom it has derived immediate benefits, such as assembly workers in low-wage countries, further duties may exist because those benefits are made possible by the persistence of unjust conditions (Kant, 1963: 194-195; Herman, 2002) . Third, there is the duty of beneficence (Murphy, 2000; Herman, 2002) : the duty to promote the well-being of others, in particular to provide aid to prevent or relieve suffering or dire conditions (Murphy, 2000: 3; Herman, 2002) . The immediate fear is that this last source of duty has no limit. Although seemingly insatiable, the duty of beneficence has been circumscribed by philosophers (Elster, 1989 The purpose of inductive theory is to provide neither a way to reconcile the two sets of considerations nor a method, theory, or argument that demonstrates the dominance of one set of claims over another (Nussbaum, 1986; Richardson, 1997 over others. That would be a propitious product, but not the intended purpose of inductive normative theorizing. The aim is to understand the compelling grounds that exist for taking alternative courses of action and to refine those grounds in light of one another. To illustrate, when concern with efficiency and misallocation is juxtaposed with the duty to aid, counterintuitive conclusions may emerge. It may well be true that companies are poorly suited to respond to illiteracy or contaminated water, problems to which, in addition, a company has not contributed. But it may nonetheless be that corporate efforts to ameliorate these problems are at least Features of the problem. Features of the specific societal ill to which a company is considering a response include its depth and breadth. The proper corporate response to a societal ill will hinge in part on the severity of the ill's effect on essential human functioning (Herman, 2002) . What is considered essential to human functioning is of course subject to debate, so it is helpful to draw on the idea of human capabilities advanced by Sen (1985 Sen ( , 1992 Sen ( , 1993 and Nussbaum (1988 Nussbaum ( , 2000 . Based on Aristotle's conception of the virtues, economic and anthropological research on developing countries, and political philosophy, Sen and Nussbaum identified ten domains of human capability vital "to truly human functioning that can command a broad cross-cultural consensus" (Nussbaum, 2000: 74) . They include such factors as bodily health (having adequate nourishment, medical care, and shelter), control over one's environment (effectively participating in the political choices that govern one's life, holding property, and access to employment), emotions (experiencing the range of emotions essential to human life), and affiliation (having meaningful personal and work relationships of mutual recognition and dignity). Whether the vying objectives, duties, and concerns intersect to obligate, permit, or proscribe a corporate response will hinge, in part, on the magnitude, the depth and breadth, of the problem's consequences for these central human capabilities. The preliminary assessment of depth focuses on whether the problem plagues an essential human capability. Then assessments of degree must be made. The severity of the problem must be considered: does the problem entail active impairment of a capability or failure to promote, but not active impairment of, the capability? Alongside these two assessments of depth, the breadth of the problem must also be considered. How many capabilities are affected, and how many people are affected? Sizing up the problem opens many questions. For example, it can be difficult to distinguish between an impairment and absence of enhancement. Illiteracy can be seen in either light. The line between essential capabilities and less-than-essential capabilities can also be difficult to draw. Support for the arts may reasonably fall on either side of that line. Our aim here is to sketch the process of inquiry; the absence of clear answers underscores the importance of dedicated attention to these questions.
Features of the firm. The features of the firm's relationship to the problem also bear on how a company ought to respond to a societal ill. First, there is the company's contribution to the problem. Presumably, a problem created by the firm, or one to which it has contributed sizably, will impose a stronger duty to act than a problem not of the firm's making. Second, the company's potential contribution to the problem's solution must be considered. The relevance of the firm's capabilities and resources to the societal ill being considered bears on the efficiency and effectiveness of the company's response, which in turn shape the strength of an imperative to respond. Third, the response required may vary in strength with a company's proximity to, or extent of mem-294/ASQ, bership in, the community in which the need arises (Herman, 2002) . Finally, the duty to respond may also vary with the benefits the corporation derives from the aggrieved constituency (Hsieh, 2003) . Chevron Texaco may have limited firm-specific capability to provide what Nigerian communities demand of it, but the integral presence of the company in Escravos, Nigeria and the benefits the company derives from its oil extraction facilities, even if those benefits are the result of explicit legal contracts, may obligate or at least license the firm to do more to redress societal problems there (Moore, 2002) . Only systematic normative analysis can work out the imperative of a response under these conditions. Features of the impact. The anticipated impact of a corporate response will also determine the ethical standing of that response. Features of the impact include the effects a corporate response is likely to have on the problem, on the larger society, and on the firm itself. The results of our descriptive research agenda should help decipher these impacts. These likely consequences will bear on the determination of whether a firm's response is permissible, prohibited, or even obligated. Exploring how negative consequences are to be weighed against positive consequences requires a thorough normative analysis. A company that can provide a quicker solution than a government agency to a problem may also, in so doing, weaken (or retard the development of) political institutions essential to representative democracy. How are these consequences to be weighed, not only in determining whether corporate action is permitted but, if it is permitted, in shaping how a response is selected, designed, and implemented?
Boundaries. Understanding the impact that a corporate response might have is also essential for understanding where the boundaries to corporate responses are erected. Contrary to the fears of some and the hopes of others, the moral foundations for corporate responses to misery do not necessarily dictate that social objectives be given as much attention as economic objectives. Business organizations may have duties and responsibilities that reach beyond economic ones, but this does not itself imply that those duties and responsibilities require comparable attention, advancement, or resources. There are two sorts of boundaries to consider. One set protects the recipients of aid, reflecting the negative consequences that can result from efforts to provide assistance. For example, the type and delivery of aid must aim to reverse dependence rather than reinforce it (Herman, 2002; Hsieh, 2003; Rawls, 1999: 111) . The second set protects the firm's capacity to perform its primary function, or functions, reflecting the potential impairment that responding to misery can entail. If a primary function of a business organization is to produce goods and services and, in so doing, generate wealth, then the firm's capacity to perform that function receives special protection. Again, contrary to the hopes of some and fears of others, this boundary is capacious. To be clear, it is the capacity of the firm to perform one of its central functions that cannot be sacrificed, not actual performance of the function itself. If a company reduces its profitability or productivity in order to ameliorate misery, that is more likely to lie within the permissible boundary, whereas efforts to ameliorate misery that impair the company's capacity to be profitable or productive would more likely be prohibited.
CONCLUSION
Managers face a vexing reality. They must find a way to do their work even as seemingly rival financial and societal demands intensify. To make matters worse, each demand can be justified or explained away by a particular conception of the firm. These dueling conceptions have inspired a generation of organizational scholars to posit and demonstrate the economic benefits of corporate responses to social misery. This has left a considerable gap in our descriptive and normative theories about the impact of companies on society. The scholarly agenda we envision accepts this tension as a starting point. The dispute among justifiable but competing demands reflects the reality that firms face in society today. By honoring the dispute and exploring the tension, we offer a different starting point for organization theory and research. In the end, this new scholarship can inform managers and citizens alike as we struggle to meet these daunting challenges.
The practical significance of the research agenda before us is no less weighty than its theoretical implications. Public pressure to satisfy each set of responsibilities, to shareholders and to other stakeholders, continues to mount (Useem, 1996; Paine, 2002) . Accountability, however, can distort behavior as much as it can enhance it (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999) . Organization theory and research may illuminate how organizations can move closer to actual fulfillment of those responsibilities, rather than offering the mere appearance of doing so (King and Lenox, 2000) . What organizational scholars have to say about corporate involvement in societal affairs seems essential, for the risks of involving companies in broad societal problems may match the risks of excluding them: corporate involvement in addressing targeted problems is no guarantee of improvement, and organizations may only further insinuate themselves into all aspects of human life (Rosen, 1985; Kunda, 1992; Willmott, 1993) . Corporate involvement may well make problems worse, or even create new ones, while reducing companies' effectiveness as economic instruments.
What is being asked and expected of corporations today is increasing even as the economic contractarian model of the firm itself has revealed clear practical limitations (Gordon, 2002) . The free market may not produce the inexorable march toward worldwide prosperity and well-being that is so often anticipated (Stiglitz, 2002) . Even as business organizations may be imperfect instruments for advancing a narrowly construed wealth-maximizing objective, ironically, they may also be the entities of last resort for achieving social objectives of all stripes. In the face of these challenges, organization theory and research can contribute to the construction, reform, and assessment of the organizations and institutions that play such an essential role in society (Stern and ing the two. The many organizational scholars who have investigated the relationship between social and financial performance have been eager to develop empirically informed theory that stimulates, if not guides, practice. Paradoxically, by acknowledging the fundamental tension that exists between the roles corporations are asked to play, organizational scholars have the opportunity to inform practice-and thereby help society-where past efforts to remove the tension have fallen short. Before rushing off to find the missing link between a firm's social and financial performance, all in hopes of advancing the cause of social performance, we need to understand the conditions under which a corporation's efforts benefit society. This asks us to question corporate social performance and competing conceptions of the firm down to their very roots. Personal values and commitments will no doubt orient the theories we prefer and the research questions we ask. To honor those values and commitments, however, we must acknowledge and question them. Such appraisals ensure the quality of our research and the integrity of our commitments.
